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Abstract 
Given the UK finance sector is one of the largest in the world, it provides the perfect setting 
for a study into the nature of the finance sector wage premium. We reveal the pervasiveness 
of this premium, across all sub-sectors of finance, and across all occupations within finance, 
and with the very highest rewards going to 40-49 year old men working in London. 
Moreover, the UK premium has continued to rise despite the recent financial crisis. 
Consequently, this study uses rich data from the UK to investigate potential explanations. We 
find that the financial sector is more skill intensive but also that financial sector workers have 
higher childhood test scores vis-à-vis non-finance workers. So we investigate to what extent 
these higher qualifications and higher cognitive skills can explain the financial pay 
differential. We then go on to consider whether the financial premium is a consequence of 
differences in job characteristics and thus whether technological change can explain the 
growth in the premium.  While each of these factors has some role to play, we find that none 
can fully explain the wage premium found in the financial sector, which we find to be 
pervasive across 17 OECD countries, including the US. We therefore attribute to this to rent-
sharing.  
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 1. Introduction. 
 
Explaining wage growth in the UK financial sector has remained a relatively under-
researched area in economics, despite receiving a lot of attention in the European media and 
the recent implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive capping banker’s bonuses at 
a maximum of one year of salary from 2014. Reed and Himmelweit (2012) loosely link the 
recent stagnation of UK wage growth to the increased importance of financial services in the 
aggregate profit share. Also Bell and Van Reenen (2010, 2013) document how high UK 
financial sector salaries are an important feature of growing wage inequality at the top end of 
the wage distribution. But there are few studies that seek to explain why the financial sector 
wage premium has risen so quickly and why it is now so high.   
 
To get some idea of the extent of the labour market differences in finance vis-à-vis the rest of 
the economy, Figure 1 uses national taxation data collected by HMRC taken from the Survey 
of Personal Incomes (SPI) to plot employment shares and average annual earned income 
ratios for the financial sector relative to those for the whole private sector between 1997 and 
2009.1 The finance employment share is relatively small and has remained fairly constant 
(and even fallen slightly) over time, from 0.057 in 1997 to 0.053 in 2009. But at the same 
time the financial sector earned income ratio is very large and has increased (from 1.81 in 
1997 to 2.63 in 2009). This suggests that the average wage in the financial sector was almost 
three times as large as the average wage across the whole private sector in 2009.  
Consequently, the main aim of this paper is to try to explain this much larger, and increasing, 
wage premium in the financial sector. We do this by drawing upon existing theories and 
potential explanations from the available literature on more general labour market inequality.    
 
It has been well documented that some countries, most notably the US and UK, experienced 
substantial growth in labour market inequality over the last two or three decades.2 This has 
led to an area of research investigating whether growing wage inequality can be explained 
through technological change. The basic idea is that the falling price of information 
technology has led to the substitution of routine labour for technology capital. As routine 
tasks tend to be performed in jobs situated in the middle of the job quality distribution, 
1 The SPI public use data are only available up to 2009. Following Philippon and Reshef (2012) most of our 
analyses excludes the public sector so that we focus specifically on explaining the private sector wage premium. 
2 See Acemoglu and Autor (2010) for a review of this literature. 
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 economies with access to information technology have witnessed decreasing employment 
shares in the middle of the earnings distribution. Consequently, employment has polarized 
into high paid and low paid jobs and inequality has risen.3 This process has become known as 
task-biased technological change (TBTC).4 Here routine tasks are thought to be substitutes, 
whilst non-routine tasks are thought to be complements with new technology.  
 
Whilst the literature on inequality and TBTC spans a number of dimensions and now also a 
number of countries, there have been relatively few studies that focus specifically on the 
financial sector. One notable exception is the study by Philippon and Reshef (2012) who try 
to explain long-run wage growth in the US financial sector by looking for changes in relative 
skill intensity. They find that the US financial sector became more skill-intensive during the 
1980s. However they also find that it was equally as skill-intensive in the 1930s and that the 
long–run skill intensity in the US financial sector therefore displayed a U shape. Moreover, 
after controlling for skills they still find significant financial sector wage differentials which 
they attribute to rent-sharing amongst financial sector workers. These rents are increasing in 
education levels. So again following the existing literature they investigate the role of 
technological change in explaining the more recent trends.  
 
Philippon and Reshef (2012) find some evidence that TBTC played a role in explaining 
increasing financial wage differentials, since they find that financial occupations have 
become relatively less routine in terms of the tasks that workers perform and more complex 
in terms of the mathematical aptitude required. However, given the long-run U-shaped trend 
for skill intensity in the financial sector, coupled with the fact that technical change can only 
explain recent trends, they investigate whether financial deregulation has also been an 
important factor. They find that information technology played an indirect role facilitating 
recent innovation in financial products and services but also that financial deregulation in the 
1980s stimulated innovation (and therefore also prior financial regulation in the 1940s stunted 
innovation) explaining increasing rents alongside increased financial risk.   
 
In terms of UK evidence, Bell and Van Reenen (2010) document increasing ‘extreme’ wage 
inequality by focussing on the income growth of the top 5 percent of British workers between 
3 See Katz and Murphy (1992), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) for the US and also Machin (2011) and Lindley 
and Machin (2011) for Britain.  
4 This concept was first introduced by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) in their more refined treatment of skill 
biased technical change (SBTC). For a survey of the literature on SBTC see Katz and Autor (1999).  
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 1998 and 2008. They find that 60 percent of the increase in this extreme wage inequality can 
be attributed to the growth in bonuses paid to workers in the financial sector. They suggest 
the existence of superstar effects5, since the dispersion of wages is higher in finance than in 
other sectors. In keeping with this idea, we investigate to what extent finance workers are 
paid more because they are better qualified or have better cognitive skills. This is related to, 
but not exactly the same as, superstar effects since we do not focus solely on chief executive 
pay.  We also look for evidence of TBTC by looking at whether there are differences in the 
non-routine task inputs of finance sector workers.  
 
To preview our results, despite the recent financial crisis we show that the UK financial wage 
premium has continued to rise. This premium is received by finance workers across all sub-
sectors, occupations and across the whole pay distribution.  Moreover, we find that the UK 
financial sector has become more skill intensive and that finance sector workers have higher 
adult numeracy scores as well as higher childhood mathematics and reading test scores, on 
average, compared to non-finance sector workers. However, these differences cannot explain 
all of the high level, or the increase in, finance sector wages.  We thus find evidence of 
unexplainable rents, even after conditioning on these childhood cognitive skill differences 
and other unobservable heterogeneity. We then go on to show that finance workers display 
higher levels of non-routine task inputs than non-finance workers, although we find little 
evidence that this differential has widened. Moreover, controlling for tasks performed, as 
well as for complex computer use and subject of degree, cannot fully explain the finance 
sector pay premium, with significant rents for finance workers still remaining. The UK 
demonstrates the second largest of these rents (at around 41 percent) in 2012 out of 21 OECD 
countries.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section measures the UK financial pay 
differential. We document the size of the finance sector pay premium, show the importance 
of including annual bonuses, and reveal how the premium varies across sub-sectors within 
finance.  Section three investigates to what extent the UK financial sector has become more 
skill intensive, whilst section four investigates whether finance workers have higher cognitive 
skills on average, relative to non-finance workers. Section five considers technological 
5 A ‘superstar effect’ is where small numbers of people dominate their particular field and receive very large 
sums of money, far above those only slightly below them in the ability distribution within their field. See Rosen 
(1981) for a discussion of superstar effects. 
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 change and the role of job tasks, whilst Section 6 looks for evidence of unexplained rents in 
the financial sectors of 21 OECD countries.  The final section concludes.  
 
2. Documenting the UK Financial Sector Pay Premium. 
 
In order to measure the UK financial pay differential and to see how it has evolved over time, 
we start by using the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD). The NESPD contains a 
sample of working individuals whose National Insurance numbers end in a given pair of 
digits. The survey is distributed to and completed by firms and is undertaken in April each 
year by the Office for National Statistics. The survey produces close to a one percent sample 
of all employees in the UK and so the sample is large relative to other UK surveys. One 
drawback of the NESPD is that it does not collect information on the qualifications or skills 
of workers, although from 1996 the NESPD did start to collect the annual gross pay of 
workers which includes incentive and bonus payments which makes it particularly attractive 
for measuring the financial pay differential. As was first identified by Bell and Van Reenen 
(2010), using weekly or monthly data to capture salaries in the UK financial sector leaves out 
a large proportion of bonus payments since these tend to be paid before the end of the 
financial year.  So for example, in the much utilised Labour Force Survey (LFS) where 
individuals are surveyed over five quarters and wages are surveyed twice a year but reported 
as weekly wages, only the wages of individuals surveyed in March/April will contain bonus 
receipts paid at the end of the financial year. This renders wages in the LFS as unsuitable for 
capturing the true extent of relative wage growth in the finance sector.  
 
The finance sector is here defined to include any business involved in financial transactions.  
It therefore includes, for example, the brokers and dealers in financial area of London (‘the 
City’), central bankers, retail bank staff, and activities connected to insurance and pension 
funds.6  A diverse range of activities can thus be found within the finance sector. 
 
Our approach is to estimate Mincer style wage equations. We use two measures of wages. 
The first is gross weekly wages which is likely to be similar to the LFS wage measure and 
largely exclude bonuses. We also use gross annual pay which will capture all labour income. 
Both measures are inflated into constant 2011 prices using the RPI. This provides 1,628,372 
6 A full list of the sub-sectors to be found within the finance sector can be found in Table within the finance 
sector can be found in Table 4. 
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 observations from 1996 to 2011, excluding missing values and workers from the non-finance 
public sector. We keep public sector workers who worked in banks in our sample because of 
the nationalisation of some banks during the financial crisis (for example the Royal Bank of 
Scotland in 2008). Including non-finance public sector workers strengthens our results in that 
they are qualitatively the same as when excluded, but the financial premiums are everywhere 
larger. Of our 1,628,372 observations 125,277 (7.7 percent) are finance sector workers. The 
real average weekly wage over the period is £492 and the real average annual labour income 
is £25,296. In finance these are £709 and £42,202 respectively. 
 
Table 1 provides the OLS estimates for the financial wage premium, clustering the standard 
errors on one-digit industry. The first column shows that on average, gross weekly wages 
were around 0.40 log points (49 percent) higher in the finance sector relative to the rest of the 
private sector, on average, conditioning only on year differences. Using annual gross pay 
(which includes bonuses) results in a larger financial pay differential of 0.46 log points (58 
percent). Controlling for gender increases the financial pay differential (to 0.55 log points 
more in terms of annual income), as we might expect given that men earn more than women 
on average (0.68 log points more in terms of annual income) and also that the financial sector 
is female dominated (55 percent of finance sector workers are women compared to 41 percent 
in the non-finance sector). The final column shows that further conditioning on region of 
residence and age reduces the financial annual pay differential again to 0.48 log points.  
 
Since the NESPD is a longitudinal data set we are able to control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity by estimating a fixed effects (FE) model. This sweeps out any of the biases in 
the OLS weekly/annual wage equations caused by correlations between the covariates and the 
time-invariant components of the error term. This is especially important here given we 
cannot control for highest qualifications, which are fixed over time for most adults.7 The first 
and third columns in Table 2 provide the OLS estimates of the financial pay differentials 
controlling for region and age, for weekly and annual pay respectively. We do not control for 
gender here to make the estimates directly comparable to the fixed effects estimates in 
columns two and four. We can see that the financial pay differential falls, as one would 
expect if there are unobservables that are positively correlated with working in the financial 
sector and also receiving higher wages.  But rather surprisingly, they do not fall by much. 
7 Subsequent sections do introduce qualifications and skills, using alternative data sets. 
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 Annual wages in the Finance sector are still 0.314 log points (37 percent) higher on average, 
relative to those for non-finance workers in the private sector, even after conditioning on age, 
region and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
Table 3 shows changes over time in the OLS estimates of the financial annual pay premium. 
This shows that the financial pay premium has increased over time from being 0.362 log 
points (44 percent) during 1997-1999 to 0.569 log points (77 percent) during 2009-2011. The 
differential shows no signs of declining, despite the start of the recession in 2008. The FE 
results are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix and demonstrate a similar pattern, albeit 
with a smaller increase over time (suggesting an increase over time in the upward bias caused 
by unobserved (to us) heterogeneity in the OLS results, possibly due to the shake-up caused 
by the financial crisis and the removal of observed (by the employer) lower ability 
employees). 
 
So far we have looked only at the average pay differential across the whole financial sector. 
However, given that the NESPD is so large, we can also look within finance to see which 
sub-sectors are paying the most. To do this we again estimate the annual pay equations using 
both OLS and FE but we now replace the financial sector dummy with 15 dummies to 
capture four digit finance sub-industries.  Not surprisingly Table 4 shows that there is a lot of 
variation within finance. The security dealers and brokers exhibit the largest OLS pay 
differentials, where dealers’ pay is on average 1.14 log points (213 percent) higher than the 
non-finance average and brokers’ pay is 1.02 log points (176 percent) higher.  The smallest 
financial pay premium is for building society workers at 0.126 log points (13 percent). The 
fixed effects estimates are again lower and actually rather similar across all sub-sectors. This 
suggests that the large returns experienced by some finance sector workers can mainly be 
attributed to more favourable earnings-enhancing characteristics (like cognitive and non-
cognitive skills etc). However there remains an unexplainable rent that is rather similar across 
the whole financial sector, which one could think of as rents averaged across all types of 
workers. 
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 Given that fixed effects estimates of the financial pay differential are based only on a sample 
of workers who change between the finance and non-finance sector, 8 we further investigate 
whether it is the movers into or out of finance that are driving the FE results. The results are 
reported in Table 5. The equations contain indicators for individuals who, in successive 
periods, move into the finance sector, who move out of the finance sector, or who remain in 
the finance sector. The omitted group, who form the reference category, are therefore those 
who remain outside the finance sector.  The dependent variable is the change in log real 
annual earnings between the two periods.  The results reveal a significant change in wages 
when individuals move both into, and out of, the finance sector, with the latter dominating. 
Thus, those individuals who move into the finance sector receive a wage gain of 0.19 log 
points (20%), while those who move out of the finance sector see their wages fall by 0.37 log 
points (31%).9 
 
The remainder of Table 5 considers those who move in and out of the finance sector into 
particular sub-sectors of finance.  The results reveal that a movement into all sub-sectors 
yields a positive gain in wages, with the largest gains being earned by those who move into 
security broking, security dealing, fund management and life insurance.  The same sub-
sectors typically see a large fall in wages when exited. 
 
One factor the analysis has not allowed for so far is that the occupations being performed 
may differ between the finance and non-finance sectors. Table A2 in the Appendix shows 
that conditioning on three-digit occupations also fails to fully explain these finance sector 
rents and demonstrates within-occupational rents for most finance workers. A stronger test is 
contained in Table 6.  Here we restrict the sample to workers in those occupations that are 
most commonly found in both the finance and non-finance sectors, such as Corporate 
Managers, Financial and Office Managers, ICT professionals, Secretaries etc.10  We then 
interact occupation dummies for each occupation in turn, with the finance sector indicator. 
The coefficients on these interactions terms are reported in Table 611, and show the finance 
8 The dataset contains 11,655 observations involving a move into the finance sector, and 11,371 observations 
involving a move out. 
9 The 2.5% wage change for stayers represents faster real wage growth in the finance sector than in the non-
finance sector. 
10 Specifically, we include the 17 three-digit occupations for which at least 5% of workers doing that job are 
found in the finance sector.  The full list of these 17 occupations can be found in Table 6.  
11 The non-interacted occupation dummies are also included in the estimated equation, but not reported in Table 
6 for reasons of space. 
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 sector annual pay premium within each occupation, i.e. the difference in wages between 
workers in the same job but working in the finance or non-finance sectors.  The OLS results 
reveal a positive finance sector premium in every occupation, most of which are statistically 
significant.  Of more interest are the fixed effects results, where a further restriction was 
imposed, that individuals had to be working in the same occupation in successive periods.12  
The interaction coefficients therefore reflect the change in wages earned by the same 
individual, working in the same occupation, but moving between the finance and non-finance 
sector.  The results reveal a positive and statistically significant finance sector premium in 
every occupation.  These premia are remarkably consistent across occupations, mostly being 
clustered around a 20 percent premium, with the highest being 0.26 log points (30 percent) 
for Corporate Managers, and the lowest being 0.12 log points (13 percent) for financial 
administrative occupations.  The occupations considered in Table 6 span the occupation 
hierarchy, and suggest a pervasive finance sector pay premium. This is consistent with the 
idea of rent-sharing, with economic rent generated within the finance sector shared between 
all workers. 
 
So far we have only looked at the average pay differential in the finance sector vis-a-vis the 
rest of the private sector. We can also look at the financial pay premium at various points of 
the pay distribution. We estimate quantile regressions for the whole private sector economy 
to get the total financial pay premiums. Table 7 reports the results for all workers.  The 
positive finance pay premium is observed at all points of the wage distribution, but this is 
non-monotonic since there are high premiums at the 10th percentile (0.58 log points), slightly 
lower in the middle and then even higher at the 99th percentile (0.60 log points). 
Consequently, Table 8 estimates quantile regressions again but just for finance sector workers 
in order to compare the characteristics of finance sector workers at different points of the 
financial pay distribution. There is a much larger gender pay differential at the 10th and the 
99th percentile compared to the rest of the distribution. In terms of the other characteristics, 
the gaps between prime-aged relative to young and old, and between London and the other 
regions, are all at their largest at the 99th percentile.  It therefore seems that the very highest 
wages in the finance sector are going to 40-49 year old men working in London. 
 
12  The dataset contains 2,276 observations involving a move into the finance sector but remaining in the same 
occupation, and 2,140 observations involving a move out into the same occupation. 
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 In summary, therefore, the analysis of the NESPD reveals a large and pervasive wage 
premium to working in the finance sector which is larger when bonuses are included as a 
measure of pay. While this is in part due to the unobserved characteristics of the individuals 
who work in the finance sector, and in part due to the jobs being performed in that sector, 
these factors alone cannot explain the wage premium in full, as a significant premium 
remains when we control for these factors using the panel element of the NESPD. We have 
argued that this is consistent with the presence of rent-sharing in the finance sector.  To 
strengthen this conclusion, however, the following sections investigate other potential 
explanations for this finance sector wage premium. 
  
 
3. Is the Finance Sector More Skill Intensive? 
 
Clearly, higher average wages in the finance sector could be explained by better qualified 
workers on average, in the finance sector relative to all other industries. It has been well 
documented that the total employment shares of graduates have increased, for example 
Lindley and Machin (2012) use the LFS to show that the employment share of graduates 
increased from 0.14 in 1996 to 0.23 in 2006 and to 0.31 in 2011. We would like to know how 
many of these graduates are employed in finance and, conditional on the increase in the 
supply of graduates, are there more of them going into finance?  
 
The first panel in Figure 2 uses the LFS to show that the finance employment share amongst 
graduates has increased from 0.046 in 1994 to 0.060 in 2008, but then fell slightly to 0.058 in 
2011. So before the start of the recession in 2008, there were more finance workers amongst 
graduates than amongst the total private sector workforce (in Figure 1 0.052 percent of all 
private sector workers were employed in finance in 2008). Panel 2 then shows that the post-
2008 fall in finance sector graduate employment share was mainly amongst postgraduate 
workers. The rising finance employment share amongst graduates has remained relatively 
steady, increasing from 0.048 in 1994 to 0.069 in 2011. For postgraduates the finance sector 
employment share increased from 0.027 in 1994 to 0.054 in 2008 and then fell substantially 
at the start of the recession to 0.039 in 2011.  
 
The two lower panels in Figure 2 show that the finance employment share is much larger for 
economics graduates, maths/computing graduates and management/business graduates, with 
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 the economists demonstrating the largest increases.13  In 2011 over a quarter of all economics 
graduates were employed in the financial sector. Figures for maths/computing and 
management/business were 10 percent and almost 11 percent respectively in 2011. Given 
these subjects are by nature more numerical, this also suggests that in the long term there has 
been numerical skill upgrading (mainly from economics graduates) in the financial sector, but 
that there was a slight fall during the recession, with fewer of these graduates going into 
finance, though this appears to have recovered again for the economists since 2010.   
 
Given that we find some evidence of skill upgrading in the financial sector, Table 9 presents 
estimates of the financial wage premium using the 1997-2008/9 British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), obtained by estimating standard Mincer earnings equations and conditioning 
on educational attainment. The BHPS is a longitudinal dataset which contains questions on 
highest qualifications as well as a measure of annual labour income that contains bonuses that 
was first asked in 1997.14  Again we condition on marital status, region of residence, age, age 
squared and year dummies.15 The OLS conditional log monthly wage differential over the 
period is 0.296 log points, while the second column shows that this is 0.582 log points for 
graduates and 0.611 log points for some college workers, demonstrating that inter-
educational financial pay differences exist. The final two columns provide the FE estimates. 
These suggest a similar sized financial labour income differential across all education groups. 
Conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity, the finance premiums are lower than the OLS 
estimates for finance graduates and some college workers, which is suggestive of higher 
cognitive skills.  This is not the case for workers with lower education levels where 
controlling for the fixed effects suggests OLS biases in the opposite direction. However, we 
cannot say how much of the unobserved heterogeneity observed here is a consequence of 
cognitive skill differences, to which we now turn. 
 
13 The subject of degree question in the LFS refers only to the undergraduate degree and therefore we do not 
know the subject of postgraduate qualifications. For detailed definitions of the subjects listed in Figure 4 see 
Lindley and McIntosh (2012). 
14 The BHPS is a sample of over 5,000 households in the UK, conducted annually since 1991 and contains 
information on human capital and socio-economic characteristics of each individual in the household. From 
1997 onwards the survey also collected information on annual labour income and bonuses. The data on annual 
earnings in the BHPS is constructed from monthly and weekly earnings rather than being directly asked. From 
1997 there was a separate question asked regarding the value of all bonuses received in the last 12 months. 
Following Bell and Van Reenen (2010) we add this value to the respondent’s annual labour income to produce 
total annual labour income including bonuses.  
15 We do not condition on gender because we want to compare the OLS estimates directly with the fixed effects 
estimates. But we know that conditioning on gender will increase the financial pay differential since men earn 
more than women and the finance sector has relatively more women than the rest of the private sector.  
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4. Do Finance Sector Workers Have Higher Cognitive Skills? 
 
In this section we investigate to what extent the finance premium might be a consequence of 
higher cognitive skills amongst finance workers, paying particular attention to differences in 
numeracy and reading skills. We start by looking at whether finance workers have better 
adult and childhood numeracy skills on average and we then go on to estimate finance wage 
premiums conditioning on our measures of cognitive skills. 
 
We draw upon the British Cohort Survey (BCS) which is a sample of men and women born 
in 1970 and the National Child Development Survey (NCDS) where respondents were born 
in 1958. The most recent sweeps of the BCS and NCDS were undertaken in 2008, when the 
BCS (NCDS) respondents were aged 38 (50) and questions were asked on various socio-
economic and work characteristics of the respondents. The surveys provide information on 
gross pay, highest educational qualification, industry of employment, marital status, gender 
and region of residence. Similar follow-ups were undertaken in 2004 but in addition to the 
standard socio-economic questions, respondents in the BCS were also tested for their 
numeracy skills.  
 
 
4.1 Differences in Adult and Childhood Test Scores 
The 2004 BCS contains more than one measure of adult numeracy skills. We use the score 
from all 23 numeracy questions that were asked, and also use the derived numeracy level 
variable which is coded into five categories. Given that finance workers could be more 
numerate because their job involves more numerical tasks, we additionally use childhood test 
scores for mathematics and reading taken when the respondents were aged 10 and 11. The 
BCS 1980 and NCDS 1969 follow-ups provide reading and mathematics tests. We think 
these childhood measures are better measures of cognitive skill since they were undertaken 
before the respondents were influenced by secondary and higher education, but more 
importantly before they started work in the finance sector. All test scores were standardised 
to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one, to make them comparable across surveys. 
 
Our initial BCS sample consists of 5,968 individuals of which 378 (6.3 percent) are employed 
in Finance. Table 10 shows that there is a significant finance differential in terms of both 
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 adult numeracy measures. This is largest for graduates and workers with A-levels. Of course 
we would expect this and the causality here is questionable. But Table 11 shows that 
childhood mathematics and reading scores were also higher for finance workers relative to 
those in other sectors. This provides better evidence that most finance workers have higher 
cognitive skills, on average, relative to non-finance workers.  
 
Table 12 shows the same as Table 11 but for 6,790 workers from the NCDS who were aged 
46 in 2004. The average finance differential for maths scores is 0.40 standard deviations, 
which is very similar to that in the BCS for 34 year olds (0.39). 16 So the maths and reading 
test scores are again higher in finance, but much more so for maths skills in the case of the 
NCDS. The finance differential for reading is lower (0.24 standard deviations) relative to that 
for the BCS (0.42). The financial graduate maths differential (1.20 standard deviations) is 
slightly larger that found in the BCS (1.02), with a larger fall between cohorts for some 
college workers (0.73 standard deviations compared to 0.44 in the BCS). This suggests that 
finance sector college workers might be becoming relatively less numerate over time, 
whereas finance A-level workers have become slightly more numerate over time, since the 
maths test score in finance is higher in the BCS (0.76 standard deviations) than in the NCDS 
(0.64). All finance workers appear to have become relatively more competent in reading, 
particularly the lower qualified finance workers, relative to non-finance workers.   
 
4.2 Wage Equations 
Given we can observe the same respondents in both the 2004 and 2008 BCS and in both the 
2004 and 2008 NCDS we can estimate panel data wage equations that control for cognitive 
skills.17 We pool the two data sets to increase sample size, and control for age. In the BCS 
and NCDS respondents are asked the question `the last time you were paid, what was your 
gross pay before deductions’. Unfortunately the 2004 BCS (and NCDS) do not include 
questions for annual labour income or bonuses, so we are faced with the familiar problem of 
potential under-reporting. For example, only 665 (14 percent) of our 4,693 BCS sample with 
16 We cannot compare the BCS age 34 in 2004 with the NCDS age 33 in 1991 because current industry of 
employment is not included in the NCDS 1991 survey. The 1999 NCDS (age 41) provides a financial 
differential (standard error) on maths scores of 5.53(0.549) and on reading scores of 2.09 (0.324). This suggests 
that the older cohort of finance workers has relatively higher cognitive mathematical skills but lower reading 
skills.  
17 We do not use the BCS 1996 sweep in our panel analysis since the gross pay variable is measured differently 
whereas it is identical in the 2004 and 2008 follow-ups. We also considered using the NCDS for comparable age 
changes using sweep 5 (age 33 in 1991) and sweep 6 (age 41 in 1999) but as already mentioned industry of 
employment is not included in the 1991 data.   
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 reported earnings listed their gross earnings responses as being annual.18  Nevertheless we 
continue to estimate financial earnings premiums using log monthly gross pay, bearing in 
mind that these are likely to be under-estimates of the total financial income premium.  
 
We start by estimating the pooled OLS financial wage premium without conditioning on 
cognitive skills, we then also estimate the same using fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and finally we do the same conditioning on cognitive skills. Our sample 
consists of 15,642 individuals of which 969 (6.1 percent) are employed in finance. We 
control for marital status, region of residence, age and year. 19 We can only control for 
childhood test scores here since the NCDS does not provide measures for adult test scores. 
Table 13 provides the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates for the finance pay premium. 
The first and third columns show that the average financial wage premium falls (from 0.262 
to 0.113 log points) when we control for unobserved heterogeneity. The fourth column shows 
that there is only a financial pay premium for graduates (0.270 log points) and workers with 
A levels (0.230 log points), once we condition on differences in the unobservables.  
 
Of course estimating fixed effects cannot distinguish OLS biases from cognitive skill 
differences or other unobserved heterogeneity. So in the final two columns of Table 13 we 
condition on childhood test scores to control for cognitive skills. The pooled OLS financial 
childhood maths premium is 0.011 log points showing that in finance there is a greater return 
to childhood maths scores relative to not being employed in finance, on average. The estimate 
of the graduate wage premium falls from 0.901 to 0.744 suggesting cognitive skills explain 
0.157 log points of the financial wage premium. For some college workers the cognitive bias 
is 0.124 log points (based on a fall from 0.539 to 0.415) and for A-Level workers this is 0.114 
log points (based on a fall from 0.293 to 0.179).  The final column conditions on unobserved 
heterogeneity and shows that the financial wage premium is now only statistically significant 
for graduates (0.461) and workers with A-Levels (0.341). Given that fixed effects is the 
within group estimator this seems to be suggesting that a graduate moving into or out of 
finance will see a bigger wage increase when holding maths test scores constant (0.461) than 
when not (0.270). For A-Level workers this is not the case since we see a smaller financial 
18 The fieldwork for the 2004 BCS was undertaken between February 2004 and June 2005. There is a question 
on annual employment income in the 2008 BCS but this is banded and does not appear in the 2004 sweep. 
Given we estimate panel data models using the 2004 and 2008 BCS/NCDS we do not use this annual 
employment income data.   
19 The number of individuals is 9345 and these are observed on average 1.7 times. 
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 return once we hold the higher test scores of the well-educated constant. However, in the 
final column the return to maths scores is lower for finance workers than non-finance 
workers, so the wage return to moving into or out of finance is higher for someone with lower 
maths scores, presumably because those with good maths scores get good wages anywhere, 
but those with poorer maths scores who nevertheless manage to get into finance get a good 
return compared to the alternative jobs they might have had.  So once we control for maths 
test scores (and given the higher educated have better test scores) the return to moving into or 
out of finance for the educated (graduates) is actually higher, but not for the less educated 
(those with A-levels) where it is lower. 
 
In summary, our results suggest that 0.157 log points of the 0.901 log point graduate financial 
pay differential is a consequence of  differences in cognitive skills (0.901-0.744), and that 
0.283 (0.744-0.461) of the OLS graduate financial pay differential is a consequence of other 
unobserved heterogeneity. with a remaining unexplainable rent of 0.461 log points. For A-
Level workers the cognitive skills difference component is 0.114 log points and the 
unobserved heterogeneity component is negative at -0.162, with a remaining rent of 0.341 log 
points.  
 
 
5. Technological Change and Task Inputs  
 
As well as the characteristics of the workers in the finance sector, the finance pay premium 
could be a consequence of workers having different job characteristics. So in this section we 
look for potential drivers of financial wage premiums by investigating whether the finance 
sector has become more intensive in non-routine task inputs and computer use, as well as 
looking to see whether these factors can partially explain the financial pay differential.  The 
GB Skills Survey (GBSS) provides the usual information on wages, human capital and socio-
economic characteristics of workers, but it also includes measures of computer use and job 
task inputs. The GBSS are cross sectional data available over a number of years, although the 
task input data are only collected since 1997. Consequently we use data from the 1997, 2001, 
2006 and 2012 cross sections providing a sample of 8,294 respondents overall. Of these 
8,294 workers, 1,857 (22.39 percent) are employed in finance. Again our sample is for 
workers aged between 16 and 65 and excludes the non-finance public sector. Gross hourly 
15 
 
 earnings are deflated into constant prices using the RPI, though these are largely thought to 
exclude bonuses.   
 
The task input measures that we draw upon include some that might be thought to capture 
non-routine tasks, see Green (2012). These are numeracy, literacy, problem-solving and 
influencing people. We also use ‘computer use complexity’ to measure technological input. 
The task input measures are derived from a range of questions asking respondents how 
important a certain skill is in their job, with respondents options `not important’, `not very 
important’, `fairly important’, `very important’ and `essential’, ranging between 1 and 5. 
These aspects of skill use are collapsed into five groups based on explanatory factor analysis. 
The variables used are described in more detail in Table A3 of the Appendix.20   
  
Table 14 shows that hourly pay, non-routine task inputs and computer use are generally 
higher in the finance relative to the non-finance sector. In terms of changes over time, the 
first row shows that the hourly pay differential has increased in non-finance to 6.97 per hour 
in 2012 and in finance to 11.27 in 2012 and the final column shows that this increase in 
hourly pay is statistically larger in the finance sector relative to non-finance (by 1.73 pounds). 
However, although workers in the finance sector generally demonstrate higher non-routine 
task inputs and computer complexity vis-a-vis non-finance, if anything this gap is closing 
rather than widening (certainly in terms of literacy and influencing people). This therefore 
fails to support the idea that TBTC might be explaining the increase in the financial pay 
differential through changes in the relative quantities of non-routine tasks being performed.  
 
In Table 15 we estimate the OLS financial log hourly pay differential using the 1997, 2001, 
2006 and 2012 GBSS data. We find a raw differential of 0.312 log points, which falls slightly 
to 0.306 once we condition on gender, marital status and region of residence. Allowing the 
financial pay differential to vary across highest NVQ level shows that again the financial pay 
differential is largest for NVQ level 4 which contains graduates (0.544) and is negative for 
those with no qualifications (-0.237). 21 For graduates, this is very similar to that found using 
weekly wages from the BHPS in Table 10 (0.566). For workers with NVQ level 1 as their 
highest qualification there is no significant financial pay differential. The fourth column 
20 See Green (2012) for a detailed discussion on the construction of these non-routine task measures.  
21 We expect these to be smaller than those found using the NESPD and BHPS given that this is a 
much smaller sample and measurement error is likely to bias the parameters towards zero.   
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 conditions on non-routine task inputs and computer use complexity. The financial pay 
differential falls slightly but is still significant for graduates (0.333), NVQ level three workers 
(0.136) and workers with no qualifications (-0.079). So in terms of the increasing prices 
(wages) attached to non-routine tasks (which are presumably in higher demand through 
TBTC), there is little evidence that differences in non-routine task endowments can fully 
explain the existing financial pay differential.    
 
In the final two columns of Table 15 we investigate the role of subject of degree. Detailed 
classifications for degree subject are only provided from 2001 onwards so our sample now is 
smaller at 6,928 workers.  The fifth column shows that the financial pay premiums are fairly 
similar for this reduced sample compared to those for the full sample in column four. The 
final column then further disaggregates graduates by their undergraduate degree subject. 
Graduates of all subjects receive a higher hourly wage premium in finance vis-à-vis non-
finance. The largest is for Maths graduates (0.492) with Computing (0.475) and 
Business/Management (0.404) receiving similarly large financial pay premiums, even after 
conditioning on non-routine task inputs and computer use complexity.  
 
In summary, we find no evidence that the higher levels of non-routine task inputs and 
computer use complexity observed in the financial sector can fully explain the financial pay 
differential, nor its increase. Conditioning on non-routine tasks and computer use reduces the 
differential but there still appears to be unexplainable rents, and these exist for graduates and 
workers with NVQ level three qualifications. The largest are for graduates with Maths, 
Computing and Business/Management degrees.  
 
 
6. Cross Country Evidence for Financial Sector Rent-Sharing. 
 
In this final section we bring together the composite sections of the paper thus far to look for 
the existence of unexplained rents by simultaneously controlling for qualifications, cognitive 
skills and non-routine task inputs. We will also look to see how pervasive finance sector rents 
are across a range of countries.  To do this we use the OECD 2012 Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) which collects information on 
wages and educational attainment as well adult test scores and task inputs for 23 OECD 
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 countries. 22   We use monthly wages that contain bonuses, as well as test scores for 
numeracy, literacy and problem solving, along with information on non-routine task inputs 
for numeracy, reading, writing, influencing people and computer use complexity. The test 
scores capture adult cognitive skills rather than childhood skills, but the task input variables 
are almost identical to those used in the previous section. This allows us to firstly compare 
skills and task inputs in the Finance sector vis-à-vis the non-Finance sector across 22 
countries, but then also to estimate wage equations conditioning firstly on gender and age, 
and then sequentially on education, adult test scores and non-routine task inputs. 23 Any 
remaining financial pay differential might therefore be attributed to unexplained rents.       
 
Table 16 contains the financial sector differentials for highest qualification and test scores for 
21 countries. The first column shows that the UK finance sector is more skill intensive than 
the rest of the Economy since it had around 17 percent more workers with International 
Standard Classification for Education (ISCED) level 5 or 6 compared to the non-finance 
sector in 2012. 24  This is not particularly high compared to some other countries, with Poland 
displaying the greatest relative skill intensity in its finance sector (29 percent) closely 
followed by Japan (23 percent) and Norway (22 percent). For the US this is lower at around 
10 percent.  
 
The second column of Table 16 shows that in terms of numeracy and literacy competency, 
most finance sectors demonstrate higher test scores relative to the non-finance sector, with 
Finland, Japan, Korea and Russia (though only for literacy) being the only exceptions.  The 
largest financial numeracy differential is in Norway, whilst for literacy it is in Estonia. Cross 
country similarities in the problem solving scores of finance vis-à-vis non-finance  workers 
demonstrate a similar pattern, with Estonia and the UK demonstrating the largest finance 
differentials. The UK financial differential is above the cross country average for all 
competencies, whereas the US financial sector differential is below it.  
 
In Table 17 we present the financial differentials in non-routine task inputs and computer use 
complexity. Uniformly (except for in Russia) finance sector workers are much more likely to 
22 See http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/ for details. 
23 We do not have the data for Australia since this is not included in the public use file.  
24 The ISCED 5 and 6 classification contains graduates and post-graduates. In the UK 50 percent of finance 
sector workers were graduates in 2012, compared to 33 percent in the non-finance sector. This is not to be 
confused with Figure 2 that shows that of all UK graduates 0.058 percent were employed in finance in 2011.  
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 report performing numeric, reading and writing tasks relative to those in non-finance. In a 
few countries finance workers report performing more influencing tasks, but the UK is not 
one of them. The final column again shows that finance sector workers in all countries (again 
aside from Russia) report greater computer use complexity in their jobs. The UK finance 
differential is above the international average for numeric task inputs and computer use 
complexity, whereas that in the US is again below it. The UK finance differential is below 
average in terms of reading and writing task inputs.  
 
Overall Tables 16 and 17 corroborate the evidence presented so far in the paper for the UK, 
namely that workers in the finance sector have higher adult test scores both for numeracy and 
literacy, but also perform more non-routine tasks in their job. These tables also demonstrate 
how pervasive these findings are across a number of countries.  Given this, we now estimate 
the financial sector pay differential, conditioning on these competencies.   
 
Table 18 presents estimates of the financial monthly log pay differential across our 21 
countries. Most of these countries have monthly wage data that include bonuses, but for five 
countries (Austria, Canada, Germany, Sweden and the US) the wage data are banded and we 
are only provided with the decile to which each respondent’s wage corresponds. For these 
countries we therefore perform interval regression.  The first column provides the raw 
differential, which is statistically significant across most countries we observe (except for 
Japan, Russia and the Slovak Republic). The largest financial pay differential is 61 log points 
for Spain, followed by 0.53 for the UK which is close to that of 0.57 found earlier using the 
NES for 2009-2011 (Table 3). The US has the 6th largest financial pay differential.  
 
The second column conditions on gender and age. Not surprisingly the financial pay 
differential falls in most countries including the UK, Spain and the US. Further conditioning 
sequentially on test scores and non-routine task inputs reduces the financial pay differential 
still further but a significant differential remains for 17 of the 21 countries observed. The 
largest is still in Spain (49 percent) and the second is in the UK (41 percent), with the US 
have the 7th largest (27 percent).  This provides further evidence of financial sector rents 
which are largest in Spain and the UK but which are prevalent in 80 percent of OECD 
countries.  
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7. Conclusion. 
 
The UK finance sector wage premium is large and has increased over time. In the UK, the 
largest returns go to male graduates, living in London, aged between 40 and 49 who are 
employed as dealers or brokers in the security broking sector. However, the premium is 
observed across different sub-sectors of finance, for different occupations, for workers with 
different qualification levels and also across most other OECD countries.  It can be found at 
all points of the pay distribution, not just at the mean. It therefore seems to be a pervasive 
feature of remuneration in the financial sector.  
 
None of the possible explanations for the finance sector pay premium, involving the 
characteristics of the workers in the finance sector, or aspects of the jobs that they do, can 
fully explain why finance sector workers are paid more than non-finance sector workers, or 
why the same worker moving between the two sectors sees his/her pay rise or fall 
accordingly (depending on direction of movement) even when doing the same job in both 
sectors.  We therefore propose that the finance sector pay premium is, at least in part, due to 
the rent-sharing of that sector’s profits.  This conclusion is supported by the fact that the pay 
premium is prevalent across jobs at all points of the occupation hierarchy, for workers of all 
skill types, at all points of the wage distribution, whilst there are unexplained rents across 80 
percent of all OECD countries.  
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 Figure 1. Finance Employment Shares and Annual Earned Income 1997-2009 (SPI). 
Employment Share    Ratio of Average Annual Earned Income 
  
Notes: For finance relative to all other private sector workers. Data are weighted.  
 
Figure 2. Finance Employment Shares of Graduates 1994-2011 (LFS) 
All Graduates     College Only and Postgraduates   
  
STEM Graduates    Non-STEM Graduates   
  
Notes: Weighted using person weights. Employed men and women aged 16-65. 
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 Table 1. OLS Estimate of the Finance Pay Differential 1996-2011 
  
Log Gross Weekly Pay 
 
 
Log Annual Gross Pay 
Finance 0.398* 
(0.139) 
0.487* 
(0.116) 
0.413* 
(0.100) 
0.459* 
(0.154) 
0.553* 
(0.127) 
0.478* 
(0.103) 
Male  0.644* 
(0.039) 
0.619* 
(0.037) 
 0.681* 
(0.039) 
0.646* 
(0.040) 
Including Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
       
N 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 
R Squared 0.043 0.193 0.324 0.036 0.144 0.282 
       
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Controls are region, age and age squared. Year 
dummies are also included, clustering on industry. Excluding the non-finance public sector. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table 2. OLS and Fixed Effects Comparison of the Finance Pay Differential 1996-2011 
  
Log Gross Weekly Pay 
 
 
Log Annual Gross Pay 
 OLS 
 
Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Finance 0.329*  
(0.119) 
0.268* 
(0.003) 
0.391* 
(0.125) 
0.314* 
(0.004) 
Including Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 
R Squared 0.186 0.024 0.185 0.013 
     
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Controls are region, age and age squared. Year 
dummies are also included, the OLS clusters on industry. Excluding the non-finance public sector. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 3. Changes Over Time: OLS Estimates of the Log Annual Pay Finance Differential 1996-2011 
 Finance Indicator N R Squared 
    
1997-1999 0.362* (0.113) 411472 0.231 
2000-2002 0.455* (0.101) 304158 0.313 
2003-2005 0.483* (0.102) 306891 0.299 
2006-2008 0.553* (0.099) 281496 0.275 
2009-2011 0.569* (0.095) 324355 0.278 
    
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Controls are male, region, age and age squared. 
Year dummies are also included. Excluding the non-finance public sector. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 4. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimate of the Sub-Sector Finance Pay Differential 1996-2011 
  
OLS 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
   
Central Bank -0.352* (0.140) -0.292* (0.022) 
Banks 0.340* (0.124) 0.338* (0.005) 
Building Societies 0.126 (0.119) 0.334* (0.012) 
Financial Leasing 0.437* (0.117) 0.305* (0.038) 
Other Credit Granting 0.378* (0.118) 0.219* (0.013) 
Finance Intermediate Investment 0.821* (0.140) 0.255* (0.019) 
Secure Dealing on Own Account 1.140* (0.159) 0.396* (0.029) 
Life Insurance  0.459* (0.119) 0.341* (0.009) 
Pension Funding  0.573* (0.123) 0.385* (0.069) 
Non-Life Insurance 0.379* (0.121) 0.335* (0.009) 
Administration of Financial Markets 0.646* (0.149) 0.119* (0.055) 
Fund Management 0.989* (0.144) 0.436* (0.022) 
Security Broking 1.016* (0.149) 0.371* (0.016) 
Activities Auxiliary to Finance NEC 0.517* (0.129) 0.266* (0.011) 
Activities Auxiliary to Ins & Pensions 0.393* (0.126) 0.291* (0.008) 
   
N 1628372 1628372 
R Squared 0.188 0.013 
   
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Controls are region, age and age squared. Year 
dummies are also included, the OLS clusters on industry. Excluding the non-finance public sector. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 5. Annual Change in Wages for Movers into and Out of Finance 1996-2011 
  
Move in 
 
 
Move Out 
 
Stay 
    
All finance 
 
N 
R squared 
 
Finance sub-sectors: 
Central Bank 
0.185* (0.007) 
 
1330356 
0.003 
 
 
# 
-0.375* (0.055) 
 
 
 
 
 
 # 
0.025* (0.007) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.022* (0.007) 
Banks 0.182* (0.007) -0.432* (0.068)  0.029* (0.007) 
Building Societies 0.185* (0.007) -0.256* (0.030)  0.082* (0.007) 
Financial Leasing # #  0.030* (0.007) 
Other Credit Granting 0.076* (0.007) -0.191* (0.060)  0.018* (0.007) 
Financial Intermediation/ Inv. 0.063* (0.007) -0.353* (0.049)  0.027* (0.007) 
Security Dealing on Own Account 0.347* (0.006) #  0.099* (0.007) 
Life Insurance  0.358* (0.007) -0.489* (0.080)  0.014   (0.007) 
Pension Funding  # # -0.017* (0.007) 
Non-Life Insurance 0.222* (0.007) -0.412* (0.049)  0.017* (0.007) 
Administration of Financial Markets # #  0.119* (0.007) 
Fund Management 0.311* (0.006) -0.774* (0.123)  0.028* (0.007) 
Security Broking 0.428* (0.006) -0.529* (0.127)  0.030* (0.007) 
Activities Auxiliary to Finance NEC 0.117* (0.007) -0.269* (0.072) -0.006   (0.007) 
Activities Auxiliary to Ins & 
Pensions 
0.145* (0.007) -0.331* (0.061) -0.002   (0.007) 
    
N 1330356   
R Squared 0.004   
    
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Dependent variable is the change in the log of 
real annual earnings. Controls are region changes.  Standard errors cluster on industry. Excluding the 
non-finance public sector. Standard errors are in parentheses. # indicates cell sizes that were too small 
for robust analysis (fewer than 100 observations). 
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 Table 6. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimate of the Finance Annual Pay Differential, Amongst 
Individuals Working in Occupations Most Commonly Found in Both Finance and Non-Finance 
Sectors 
  
OLS 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
     
111 Corporate managers  0.376* (0.065)  0.263* (0.026) 
113 Functional managers  0.320* (0.030)  0.196* (0.008) 
114 Customer care manager  0.007  (0.033)  0.206* (0.026) 
115 Financial and office managers  0.255* (0.029)  0.173* (0.010) 
213 ICT professionals  0.119* (0.013)  0.159* (0.014) 
242 Business/statistical professionals  0.103* (0.012)  0.127* (0.014) 
313 IT service delivery  0.170* (0.031)  0.188* (0.022) 
352 Legal associate professionals  0.305* (0.013)  0.177* (0.046) 
353 Business/finance ass. professionals  0.219* (0.024)  0.131* (0.011) 
354 Sales associate professionals  0.065   (0.036)  0.163* (0.020) 
412 Admin occupations: finance 
413 Admin occupations: records 
 0.067   (0.044) 
0.165  (0.078) 
 0.124* (0.008) 
0.147* (0.013) 
414 Admin occupations: comms  0.136  (0.068)  0.171* (0.046) 
415 General admin  0.263* (0.074)  0.163* (0.010) 
421 Secretarial  0.344* (0.082)  0.185* (0.014) 
712 Sales related  0.288* (0.057)  0.194* (0.020) 
721 Customer service  0.341* (0.076) 
 
 0.147* (0.015) 
N  548858  361761 
R Squared  0.393  0.250 
     
Notes: NES sample of men and women age 16-65. Reported coefficients are those on an interaction 
term between working in the finance sector and the named occupation. Other variables included are 
the same occupations (non-interacted), region, age and age squared. Year dummies are also included, 
the OLS clusters on industry. Excluding the non-finance public sector. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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 Table 7. Quantile Regressions for the Conditional Financial Pay Differential 1996-2011. 
Percentile: 10th  25th  50th 75th  90th  99th 
       
Finance 0.582* 
(0.006) 
0.492* 
(0.003)* 
0.412* 
(0.002) 
0.348* 
(0.002) 
0.360* 
(0.003) 
0.601* 
(0.003) 
N 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Year dummies are also included,. Excluding the 
non-finance public sector. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on industry.  
 
 
Table 8. Quantile Pay Regressions For Finance Sector Workers 1996-2011. 
Percentile: 10th  25th  50th 75th  90th  99th 
       
Men 0.688* 
(0.011) 
0.599* 
(0.006) 
0.493* 
(0.004) 
0.544* 
(0.004) 
0.593* 
(0.007) 
0.753* 
(0.019) 
Age 16-29 
 
-0.473* 
(0.017) 
-0.308* 
(0.009) 
-0.295* 
(0.007) 
-0.335* 
(0.007) 
-0.408* 
(0.011) 
-0.606* 
(0.032) 
Age 30-39 0.085*  
(0.017) 
0.083* 
(0.009) 
0.094* 
(0.007) 
0.089* 
(0.007) 
0.081* 
(0.011) 
0.022* 
(0.032) 
Age 40-49 0.177* 
(0.018) 
0.169* 
(0.009) 
0.169* 
(0.007) 
0.181*  
(0.007) 
0.193* 
(0.012) 
0.223* 
(0.004) 
Rest of S East -0.498* 
(0.015) 
-0.497* 
(0.008) 
-0.528* 
(0.006) 
-0.645* 
(0.006) 
-0.887* 
(0.010) 
-1.281* 
(0.029) 
South West -0.600* 
(0.019) 
-0.568* 
(0.010) 
-0.566* 
(0.008) 
-0.684* 
(0.008) 
-0.921* 
(0.013) 
-1.392* 
(0.028) 
Midlands -0.551* 
(0.019) 
-0.593* 
(0.009) 
-0.629* 
(0.008) 
-0.777* 
(0.008) 
-1.011* 
(0.012) 
-1.379* 
(0.035) 
North West -0.587* 
(0.019) 
-0.588* 
(0.010) 
-0.607* 
(0.008) 
-0.742* 
(0.008) 
-1.020* 
(0.013) 
-1.465* 
(0.037) 
North -0.625* 
(0.018) 
-0.627* 
(0.009) 
-0.637* 
(0.007) 
-0.746* 
(0.008) 
-0.979* 
(0.012) 
-1.458* 
(0.037) 
Wales -0.639* 
(0.033) 
-0.621* 
(0.017) 
-0.709* 
(0.013) 
-0.864* 
(0.014) 
-1.115* 
(0.022) 
-1.585* 
(0.061) 
Scotland -0.474* 
(0.020) 
-0.512* 
(0.010) 
-0.535* 
(0.008) 
-0.646* 
(0.008) 
-0.874* 
(0.013) 
-1.280* 
(0.037) 
       
N 125277 125277 125277 125277 125277 125277 
Notes: NESPD sample of men and women age 16-65. Year dummies are also included, clustering on 
industry. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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 Table 9. Estimate of the Log Annual Labour Income Finance Pay Differential, BHPS 1997-2008 
 OLS  Fixed Effects 
    
Finance 0.296* (0.128)   0.127* (0.022)  
Finance*Graduates  0.582* (0.125)   0.172* (0.047) 
Finance*SMC  0.611* (0.132)   0.125* (0.049) 
Finance*2 Plus A Levels  0.166 (0.126)   0.120* (0.045) 
Finance*Other Q  0.008 (0.128)   0.097* (0.038) 
      
N 52185 52185  52185 52185 
R Squared 0.144 0.149  0.110 0.111 
      
Notes: BHPS sample of men and women age 16-65. Conditioning on married, region, age and age 
squared. Year dummies are also included, clustering on industry. Excluding the non-finance public 
sector. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 10. BCS: OLS Estimate of the Finance Differential for Standardised Adult Test Scores 
  
Standardised Numeracy Test Score  
 
 
 
 
 
Numeracy Level 
 
Finance 0.364* (0.049)   0.419* (0.057)  
Finance*Graduates  0.703* (0.119)   0.823* (0.140) 
Finance*SMC  0.427* (0.108)   0.524* (0.127) 
Finance* A Levels  0.565* (0.128)   0.715* (0.151) 
Finance*Other Q  0.187* (0.066)   0.181* (0.078) 
      
N 5968 5968  5968 5968 
R Squared 0.029 0.032  0.031 0.031 
      
Notes: BCS sample of men and women born in 1970 and observed in 2004. Conditioning on gender. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 11. BCS: OLS Estimate of the Finance Differential for Standardised Childhood Test Scores 
  
Standardised Maths Test (Age 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardised Reading Test (Age 10) 
 
Finance 0.391* (0.052)   0.419* (0.052)  
Finance*Graduates  1.021* (0.127)   0.909*  (0.128) 
Finance*SMC  0.436* (0.115)   0.470*  (0.116) 
Finance*A Levels  0.756* (0.137)   0.728*  (0.137) 
Finance*Other Q  0.089  (0.071)   0.172*  (0.071) 
      
N 5968 5968  5968 5968 
R Squared 0.012 0.020  0.016 0.022 
      
Notes: BCS sample of men and women born in 1970 and observed in 2004 (age 34). Conditioning on 
gender.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 12. NCDS: OLS Estimate of the Finance Differential for Standardised Childhood Test Scores 
  
Standardised Maths Test (Age 11) 
 
 
Standardised Reading Test (Age 11) 
 
Finance 0.402* (0.057)  0.235* (0.057)  
Finance*Graduates  1.195* (0.183)  0.839*  (0.183) 
Finance*SMC  0.725* (0.141)  0.420*  (0.141) 
Finance*A Levels  0.639* (0.124)  0.442*  (0.124) 
Finance*Other Q  0.090  (0.076)  0.005    (0.076) 
     
N 6790 6790 6790 6790 
R Squared 0.008 0.014 0.002 0.006 
     
Notes: NCDS sample of men and women born in 1958 and observed in 2004 (age 46). Conditioning 
on gender. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 13. BCS and NCDS: Estimate of the Finance Monthly Gross Pay Differential in 2004 & 2008 
  
Base Model 
 
 
Conditioning on Child Test 
Scores 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Finance 0.262* 
(0.026) 
 0.113* 
(0.048) 
   
Finance*Graduates  
 
0.901* 
(0.071) 
 0.270* 
(0.019) 
0.744* 
(0.106) 
0.461* 
(0.195) 
Finance*SMC  
 
0.539* 
(0.061) 
 0.034 
(0.107) 
0.415* 
(0.091) 
0.169 
(0.156) 
Finance*A Levels  
 
0.293* 
(0.061) 
 0.230** 
(0.133) 
0.179* 
(0.090) 
0.341** 
(0.177) 
Finance*Other Q  
 
-0.004 
(0.036) 
 0.061 
(0.069) 
-0.090 
(0.067) 
0.158 
(0.125) 
Finance*Maths Score     0.011* 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.006) 
Finance*Reading Score     -0.011* 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
       
N 15642 15642 15642 15642 15642 15642 
R Squared 0.040 0.051 0.005 0.005 0.052 0.005 
       
Notes: BCS (NCDS) sample of men and women born in 1970 (1958) observed in 2004 and 2008. 
Conditioning on marital status, region of residence and year. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 14. Hourly Wages, Non-Routine Task Inputs and Computer Use Complexity, 1997 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
Non-Finance 
 
Finance 
 
 
Difference 
in the 
Difference 
  
1997 
 
 
2012 
 
2012-1997 
 
1997 
 
 
2012 
 
2012-1997 
        
Hourly Pay 6.561 6.966 0.405* 
(0.173) 
9.134 11.27 2.138* 
(0.872) 
1.732* 
(0.568) 
Numeracy 1.847 1.897 0.062 
(0.056) 
2.117 2.170 -0.024 
(0.113) 
-0.086 
(0.121) 
Literacy 2.175 2.323 0.148* 
(0.047) 
2.746 2.705 -0.041 
(0.087) 
-0.189** 
(0.101) 
Problem Solving 2.697 2.751 0.054 
(0.043) 
2.892 2.810 -0.082 
(0.084) 
-0.135 
(0.092) 
Influencing  1.954 2.165 0.210* 
(0.040) 
2.197 2.241 0.044 
(0.076) 
-0.166** 
(0.085) 
Computer Complexity 1.224 1.496 0.271* 
(0.049) 
2.004 2.179 0.177** 
(0.097) 
-0.095 
(0.106) 
        
N 1102 1061  264 356   
        
Notes: GB Skills Survey sample of men and women born in observed in 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2012. 
All estimates are weighted using person weights.   
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 Table 15. OLS Estimates of the Finance Hourly Pay Differential 1997-2012 
  
Using GB Skills Survey 
1997-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using GB Skills 
Survey 2001-2012 
 
        
Finance 0.312* 
(0.018) 
0.306* 
(0.016) 
     
Finance*HNVQ==4   0.544* 
(0.025) 
0.333* 
(0.023) 
 
 
0.355* 
(0.024) 
 
Finance*HNVQ==3   0.279* 
(0.028) 
0.136* 
(0.026) 
 
 
0.113* 
(0.028) 
0.115* 
(0.028) 
Finance*HNVQ==2   0.075* 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.022) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
Finance*HNVQ==1   0.037 
(0.049) 
0.067 
(0.043) 
 
 
0.062 
(0.046) 
0.063 
(0.046) 
Finance*No Quals   -0.237* 
(0.035) 
-0.093* 
(0.029) 
 
 
-0.079* 
(0.035) 
-0.081* 
(0.034) 
Finance*Maths        0.492* 
(0.081) 
Finance*Computing       0.475* 
(0.128) 
Finance*Medical/Science       0.373* 
(0.061) 
Finance*Social Science       0.328* 
(0.093) 
Finance*Art/Humanities       0.336* 
(0.076) 
Finance*Business/Manag
ement 
      0.404* 
(0.061) 
Finance*Law       0.385* 
(0.089) 
Finance*Other Subject       0.266* 
(0.031) 
        
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Tasks and Computer Use No No No Yes  Yes Yes 
        
N 8294  6928 
        
Notes: GB Skills Survey sample of men and women born in observed in 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2012. 
Controls are gender, marital status, region of residence and year. All estimates are weighted using 
person weights.  
  
33 
 
 Table 16 Cross Country Finance Sector Differentials in Highest Qualifications and Adult Test Scores 
in 2012 
 
 
 
ISCED 5/6 
 
 
Numeracy 
 
Literacy 
 
Problem Solving 
 
N 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.  
Austria -0.015 0.030 13.405* 3.432 12.679* 3.011 10.117* 3.202 2652 
Belgium 0.144* 0.044 19.229* 4.098 19.474* 4.093 12.209* 3.957 2338 
Canada 0.127* 0.027 10.499* 3.231 10.634* 2.673 6.106** 3.055 14368 
Czech Rep 0.113 0.076 11.169** 5.690 10.298** 5.635 14.161* 6.802 2709 
Denmark 0.067 0.047 13.028* 3.878 12.167* 3.460 6.511** 3.992 4064 
Estonia 0.160* 0.055 22.032* 4.234 22.300* 4.120 26.006* 4.823 3695 
Finland 0.120** 0.062 6.969 5.808 3.932 5.470 0.703 5.531 3354 
France 0.203* 0.040 17.049* 3.449 14.981* 3.183 - - 3019 
Germany -0.007 0.036 15.985* 4.390 12.129* 4.291 7.309** 4.334 3018 
Ireland 0.108* 0.036 15.436* 4.299 15.107* 4.100 9.051* 3.749 2630 
Italy 0.078 0.058 17.938* 5.672 18.800* 5.591 - - 1658 
Japan 0.227* 0.054 7.763 5.762 6.210 5.064 0.800 6.744 2966 
Korea 0.063 0.043 4.543 3.966 3.455 3.930 -1.553 4.011 2845 
Netherlands -0.009 0.048 13.147* 3.803 13.353* 3.264 10.908* 3.677 2750 
Norway 0.216* 0.064 23.566* 5.888 18.396* 5.726 19.616* 5.173 3214 
Poland 0.290* 0.048 14.783* 6.236 18.042* 5.521 11.847 7.910 3046 
Russian Fed 0.150* 0.073 14.275** 8.903 -5.583 9.668 18.526* 6.476 1453 
Slovak Rep 0.116* 0.058 11.981* 5.580 7.300** 4.195 7.746 5.574 1974 
Spain 0.167* 0.059 15.493* 5.571 12.207* 5.007 - - 1941 
Sweden 0.097** 0.063 19.506* 6.314 18.549* 5.497 14.596* 6.042 2631 
UK 0.167* 0.056 17.011* 5.112 13.916* 3.973 21.399* 3.953 4350 
US 0.095** 0.055 9.668* 4.828 11.224* 4.869 8.167* 3.882 2735 
Average 0.122* 0.011 14.29* 1.102 12.251* 1.038 10.751* 1.164 73410 
Notes: Using the OECD PIAAC 2012 public use micro data.  For working men and women aged 16 to 
65.  
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 Table 17 Cross Country Finance Sector Differentials in Non-Routine Task Inputs and Complex 
Computer Use in 2012 
  
Numeric  
Tasks 
 
 
Reading  
Tasks 
 
Writing  
Tasks 
 
Influencing  
Tasks 
 
Computer 
Complexity 
 
N 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.  
Austria 0.605* 0.082 0.423* 0.059 0.435* 0.069 0.247* 0.060 0.415* 0.053 2652 
Belgium 0.775* 0.114 0.472* 0.074 0.293* 0.072 0.185* 0.064 0.334* 0.043 2338 
Canada 0.527* 0.069 0.328* 0.040 0.277* 0.043 -0.013 0.048 0.472* 0.033 14368 
Czech Rep 0.706* 0.149 0.553* 0.151 0.696* 0.119 0.400* 0.115 0.492* 0.056 2709 
Denmark 0.562* 0.091 0.322* 0.058 0.116* 0.056 0.034 0.068 0.343* 0.046 4064 
Estonia 0.623* 0.104 0.303* 0.058 0.269* 0.055 0.165* 0.076 0.426* 0.045 3695 
Finland 0.645* 0.091 0.253* 0.063 0.313* 0.064 0.032 0.101 0.317* 0.049 3354 
France 0.376* 0.103 0.113* 0.050 0.267* 0.063 0.044 0.062 0.392* 0.035 3019 
Germany 0.615* 0.083 0.340* 0.075 0.142* 0.060 0.070 0.069 0.469* 0.058 3018 
Ireland 0.709* 0.095 0.201* 0.064 0.511* 0.071 -0.077 0.087 0.559* 0.054 2630 
Italy 0.795* 0.196 0.466* 0.104 0.577* 0.103 0.393* 0.100 0.531* 0.066 1658 
Japan 0.056 0.081 0.295* 0.099 0.432* 0.101 0.337* 0.120 0.096 0.069 2966 
Korea 0.365* 0.091 0.592* 0.095 0.402* 0.122 0.320* 0.073 0.251* 0.050 2845 
Netherlands 0.510* 0.105 0.176* 0.067 0.174* 0.078 -0.056 0.070 0.319* 0.045 2750 
Norway 0.732* 0.162 0.113* 0.069 0.178* 0.076 0.020 0.059 0.336* 0.043 3214 
Poland 0.517* 0.176 0.134* 0.082 0.456* 0.099 0.237* 0.079 0.582* 0.092 3046 
Russian Fed 0.342 0.242 -0.004 0.181 0.284 0.192 0.345** 0.223 0.314 0.198 1453 
Slovak Rep 0.539* 0.088 0.390* 0.097 0.460* 0.092 0.361* 0.124 0.427* 0.062 1974 
Spain 0.784* 0.145 0.637* 0.125 0.526* 0.095 0.434* 0.118 0.402* 0.061 1941 
Sweden 0.524* 0.105 0.278* 0.095 0.233* 0.068 0.116 0.092 0.291* 0.063 2631 
UK 0.763* 0.119 0.179* 0.079 0.246* 0.067 0.109 0.094 0.393* 0.058 4350 
US 0.357* 0.100 0.150* 0.056 0.296* 0.068 -0.026 0.068 0.348* 0.051 2735 
Average 0.565* 0.027 0.305* 0.019 0.345* 0.019 0.167* 0.021 0.387* 0.015 73410 
Notes: Using the OECD PIAAC 2012 public use micro data.  For working men and women aged 16 to 
65.  
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 Table 18 Cross Country Finance Sector Log Monthly Pay Differentials (Including Bonuses) for 2012 
  
Raw Pay 
Differential 
 
 
Conditioning on 
Gender and Age 
 
 
Additionally 
Conditioning on 
Highest 
Qualification 
 
Additionally 
Conditioning on 
Literacy and 
Numeracy 
Test Scores 
 
 
Additionally 
Conditioning on 
Problem 
Solving and 
Task Inputs 
 
 
N 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.  
AustriaA 0.376* 0.069 0.320* 0.061 0.342* 0.059 0.319* 0.059 0.226* 0.057 2129 
Belgium 0.236* 0.044 0.226* 0.034 0.163* 0.034 0.151* 0.033 0.099* 0.035 1826 
CanadaA 0.223* 0.032 0.182* 0.028 0.161* 0.027 0.153* 0.027 0.118* 0.025 11964 
Czech Rep 0.297** 0.163 0.294** 0.155 0.213 0.155 0.187 0.160 0.121 0.151 1720 
Denmark 0.400* 0.047 0.311* 0.037 0.282* 0.037 0.274* 0.038 0.244* 0.030 3227 
Estonia 0.355* 0.069 0.387* 0.064 0.355* 0.058 0.321* 0.058 0.271* 0.058 2321 
Finland 0.266* 0.068 0.228* 0.051 0.176* 0.044 0.170* 0.044 0.124* 0.042 2647 
FranceB 0.333* 0.042 0.373* 0.037 0.276* 0.034 0.260* 0.032 0.223* 0.031 2571 
GermanyA 0.479* 0.079 0.430* 0.067 0.431* 0.065 0.423* 0.065 0.363* 0.063 2575 
Ireland 0.255* 0.088 0.207* 0.080 0.200* 0.078 0.189* 0.079 0.172* 0.074 1734 
ItalyB 0.447* 0.075 0.440* 0.066 0.407* 0.062 0.371* 0.060 0.238* 0.061 1014 
Japan 0.170 0.127 0.287* 0.092 0.214* 0.083 0.208* 0.088 0.176* 0.061 1986 
Korea 0.357* 0.062 0.332* 0.057 0.309* 0.064 0.307* 0.065 0.273* 0.062 1858 
N’lands 0.382* 0.066 0.266* 0.054 0.288* 0.050 0.275* 0.051 0.225* 0.052 2191 
Norway 0.331* 0.085 0.255* 0.062 0.211* 0.058 0.188* 0.057 0.148* 0.060 2770 
Poland 0.165** 0.094 0.220* 0.095 0.138 0.096 0.124 0.092 0.115 0.082 1828 
Russian F 0.156 0.102 0.262 0.177 0.252 0.181 0.187 0.185 0.155 0.185 919 
Slovak R 0.095 0.092 0.256* 0.096 0.233* 0.103 0.213* 0.103 0.170 0.092 1309 
SpainB 0.609* 0.154 0.558* 0.141 0.489* 0.135 0.482* 0.133 0.401* 0.130 1464 
SwedenA 0.124* 0.058 0.109* 0.052 0.089** 0.050 0.068 0.049 0.023 0.046 2371 
UK 0.531* 0.089 0.494* 0.069 0.455* 0.066 0.435* 0.065 0.347* 0.063 3402 
USA 0.385* 0.083 0.378* 0.073 0.348* 0.068 0.325* 0.067 0.238* 0.064 2313 
Notes: Using the OECD PIAAC 2012 public use micro data.  For working men and women aged 16 to 
65 with positive earnings data. Most earnings equations are estimated using the piaacreg command.  
A denotes countries where the earnings equations are estimated using interval regression as worker 
wages are banded into deciles. 
B denotes countries without problem solving test scores. Controls consist of a gender dummy, 9 age 
dummies, four highest ISCED dummies, as well as the test scores and non-routine task inputs from 
Tables 16 and 17.  
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 Appendix 
Table A1. Changes Over Time: Fixed Effects Estimates of the Log Annual Gross Pay Finance 
Differential 1996-2011 
 Finance Indicator N R Squared 
    
1997-1999 0.197* (0.016) 411472 0.080 
2000-2002 0.135* (0.010) 304158 0.009 
2003-2005 0.206* (0.013) 306891 0.087 
2006-2008 0.186* (0.017) 281496 0.010 
2009-2011 0.237* (0.017) 324355 0.117 
    
Notes: NES sample of men and women age 16-65. Controls are region, age and age squared. Year 
dummies are also included. Excluding the non-finance public sector. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table A2. OLS and Fixed Effects Estimate of the Sub-Sector Finance Annual Pay Differential 
Conditioning on Three Digit Occupation 1996-2011 
  
OLS 
 
 
Fixed Effects 
     
Finance 0.219* (0.027) - 0.233* (0.004) - 
Central Bank  -0.401* (0.051)  -0.389* (0.021) 
Banks  0.209* (0.028)  0.238* (0.006) 
Building Societies  0.042  (0.032)  0.245* (0.011) 
Financial Leasing  0.179* (0.026)  0.225* (0.037) 
Other Credit Granting  0.189* (0.028)  0.158* (0.013) 
Finance Intermediate Investment  0.447* (0.036)  0.189* (0.018) 
Security Dealing on Own Account  0.710* (0.045)  0.318* (0.028) 
Life Insurance   0.270* (0.030)  0.278* (0.009) 
Pension Funding   0.367* (0.027)  0.335* (0.067) 
Non-Life Insurance  0.202* (0.031)  0.266* (0.009) 
Administration of Fin Markets  0.268* (0.037)  0.073  (0.054) 
Fund Management  0.577* (0.036)  0.356* (0.021) 
Security Broking  0.601* (0.041)  0.287* (0.016) 
Activities Auxiliary to Fin NEC  0.226* (0.028)  0.189* (0.011) 
Activities Auxiliary to Ins & Pens  0.182* (0.032)  0.224* (0.008) 
     
N 1628372 1628372 1628372 1628372 
R Squared 0.444 0.445 0.152 0.153 
     
Notes: NES sample of men and women age 16-65. Controls are occupation, region, age and age 
squared. Year dummies are also included, the OLS clusters on industry. Excluding the non-finance 
public sector. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table A3: The Composition of the specific task measures from the GB Skills Surveys.  
 
 
Task 
 
 
Variables and description from the GB Skills Surveys 
Literacy: READFORM: reading written information, eg forms, notices or signs  
READSHORT: reading short documents eg letters or memos  
READLONG: reading long documents eg long reports, manuals, etc  
WRITFORM: writing material such as forms, notices or signs  
WRITESHORT: writing short documents, eg letters or memos  
WRITLONG: writing long documents with correct spelling/grammar  
Numeracy: MATHS1: adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing numbers  
MATHS2: calculations using decimals, percentages or fractions.  
MATHS3: more advanced mathematical or statistical procedures  
Influencing: INSTRUCT: instructing, training or teaching people  
PERSUADE: persuading or influencing others  
SPEECH: making speeches or presentations  
PLANOTH: planning the activities of others  
LISTEN: listening carefully to colleagues  
Problem Solving: FAULT: spotting problems or faults  
CAUSE: working out the cause of problems or faults  
PROBSOLVE: thinking of solutions to problems  
ANALYSE: analysing complex problems in depth  
Computer Complexity: Importance of computer use and complexity of computer use: 
Not at all=0 
Straightforward use =1 
Moderate use =2 
Complex use =3 
Advanced use =4  
Notes: Based on the factor analysis conducted in Green (2012). 
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